Although LHWCA claims arising from injuries sustained in California fall within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, issues addressed by sister circuits can nonetheless be persuasive.  This is especially true when other circuits address issues of first impression. 

In Charpentier, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an issue of first impression at the appellate level.  Specifically, the Court interpreted the definition of “final decision” as used in Section 921(c) of the LHWCA. 

Section 921(c) provides in pertinent part:

As practitioners under the LHWCA are well aware, a compensation order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) becomes effective when it is filed in the office of the deputy commissioner and payment based thereon is required even if that order is appealed to the Benefits Review Board (BRB) or to the Court of Appeals.  33 U.S. C. §§921(a), 921(b)(3), 921(c).  The fact that payments must be made during the appellate process often factors into the employer or carrier’s economic assessment as to whether or not to appeal a compensation order in the first place.  This is because an effective mechanism to recoup such payments after a successful appeal does not exist.  As such, it is relevant to the LHWCA practitioner to know when payments can be terminated.  It was this issue that the Court addressed in Charpentier.

 In Charpentier, following the death of her husband, petitioner (hereinafter “widow”) sought and obtained a compensation award for the payment of death benefits from the ALJ.  The BRB affirmed the ALJ award and the employer appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals vacated the BRB’s order and remanded the case.  The employer immediately ceased paying benefits to the widow on the date the Court of Appeal issued its opinion.  The widow filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court which was denied months later.

The issue before the Court of Appeals was the date on which the employer was no longer obligated to pay benefits per Section 921(c).  The widow argued that in the absence of any stay order, the employer was required to continue payments until the Supreme Court denied her petition.  The employer, on the other hand, argued that once the Court vacated the BRB’s orders, there was no longer any “award” under which payments were due. 

As this was an issue of first impression at the appellate level, neither party cited any legal authority for their respective position and both parties relied on what they considered to be a “plain reading” of Section 921(c).  According to the Court of Appeal, both parties were incorrect in their interpretation.