CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURT (SIMERLY) APPLIES SCOTUS’ BATTERTON DECISION TO DENY LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IN SEAMAN CASE
By Barry W. Ponticello and Renee C. St.Clair
BACKGROUND
The issue of uniformity in maritime law is one that arises in litigation on a regular basis. In particular, the issue of damages, and the role of the Congressional statutory scheme in the application of uniformity as to the scope of damages had been bandied about for decades, until coming to conclusion before the United States Supreme Court. England Ponticello & St. Clair (“EPS”) had litigated these issues in more than a handful of cases across state and Federal courts over a prolonged period, before finally moving the topic to SCOTUS resolution. Eventually, in one of these matters, the United States Supreme Court granted review in The Dutra Group v. Batterton 588 U.S. 358 (2019). The case addressed an important question concerning the scope of damages available to seamen under general maritime law: whether punitive damages may be recovered on a claim for unseaworthiness where they would be barred under the Jones Act statutory scheme.
The underlying action arose from injuries sustained by Christopher Batterton, a crew member working aboard a vessel owned by The Dutra Group. Batterton asserted claims for negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness under general maritime law, and maintenance and cure, and sought punitive damages on his unseaworthiness claim.
EPS moved to strike the punitive damages claim, arguing that punitive damages were unavailable for unseaworthiness under Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. 498 U.S. 19 (1990) and the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014). The United States District Court denied the motion but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit granted review and affirmed, in part due to an earlier Circuit decision in Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), but also noting the issue was more closely aligned with Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend 557 U.S. 404 (2009), which permitted punitive damages for the distinct maritime claim of maintenance and cure.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision created a direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit and paved the way for Supreme Court review. Together with former United States Solicitor Seth Waxman, EPS and the maritime employer petitioned and obtained a grant of certiorari. Thereafter, in a 6-3 decision, SCOTUS reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that a seaman may not recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness.
The uniformity and scope of damages issues have arisen once again recently, in Simerley v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation District, filed August 11, 2026, and certified for publication. In this case, the California Court of Appeal expressly applied the analytical framework established in Batterton to another question concerning the permissible scope of damages under general maritime law: whether the spouse of an injured Jones Act seaman may recover loss of consortium damages based upon an unseaworthiness claim.
THE BATTERTON FRAMEWORK
Batterton addressed the relationship between judicially developed general maritime law, and the remedies Congress has authorized by statute. Although federal courts possess authority to develop general maritime law, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts exercising that authority must look primarily to legislative enactments for policy guidance.
In reaching its decision, Batterton reconciled two prior Supreme Court decisions that had sometimes been viewed as reflecting competing approaches: Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. 49, which emphasized uniformity between statutory maritime remedies and general maritime law, and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, which examined whether a particular remedy had historically been available for the maritime cause of action at issue.
Rather than treating Miles and Townsend as competing rules, Batterton applied both. As later summarized by the Simerley court, Batterton essentially reaffirmed the two-step framework reflected in Townsend and added consideration of whether policy grounds nevertheless compel the requested relief.
The analysis asks:
- Whether the particular remedy was traditionally available for the particular general maritime law claim at issue;
- Whether allowing the remedy is consistent with the parallel statutory scheme and the objective of maintaining uniformity with Congress’s expressed policies; and
- Whether policy considerations nevertheless compel recognition of the requested remedy.
The claim-specific nature of the inquiry was critical in Batterton. The Court rejected reliance on historical cases involving maintenance and cure to establish the availability of punitive damages for unseaworthiness. The proper inquiry was not whether punitive damages had existed somewhere within maritime law, but whether they had traditionally been available for the particular claim of unseaworthiness.
Applying that framework, the Court found no established historical tradition of punitive damages for unseaworthiness. It then looked to the parallel Jones Act statutory scheme. Because punitive damages were unavailable under the Jones Act, permitting them for the overlapping general maritime unseaworthiness claim would undermine the uniformity emphasized in Miles. Finally, the Court found no policy basis sufficient to justify creating the additional remedy.
The Court therefore held that “[p]unitive damages are not a traditional remedy for unseaworthiness” and that the rule of Miles—promoting uniformity in maritime law and deference to congressional policy—prevented recognition of a new entitlement to punitive damages where none had historically existed.
APPLICATION OF THE BATTERTON FRAMEWORK IN SIMERLEY
Simerley presented a different requested remedy but a notably similar legal question.
Tracy Simerley, a Jones Act seaman, allegedly sustained injuries while working aboard a ferry owned by the Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation District. He and his wife, Lynette Simerley, filed suit asserting, among other claims, Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness. Lynette sought damages for loss of consortium. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to her consortium claim without leave to amend, and she appealed.
The Court of Appeal began by identifying Miles, Townsend, and Batterton as the Supreme Court trilogy addressing whether requested relief is available under general maritime law in light of federal maritime legislation. The court expressly observed that Simerley presented “a similar question.”
Lynette argued that Batterton was neither directly on point nor controlling because it concerned punitive damages rather than loss of consortium. The Court of Appeal rejected that distinction. It emphasized that, like Batterton, Simerley involved a Jones Act seaman seeking a remedy under general maritime law in connection with a personal-injury unseaworthiness claim. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Townsend/Batterton framework governed the analysis.
The court first separately determined that loss of consortium is not recoverable under the Jones Act. It then applied the Batterton framework to determine whether the remedy could nevertheless be recovered under general maritime law.
Historical Availability of the Remedy
Following Batterton’s claim-specific historical analysis, the court asked whether loss of consortium had traditionally been available for personal-injury unseaworthiness claims, rather than whether consortium-type damages had ever appeared elsewhere in maritime law.
The court examined the authorities offered to establish a historical basis for the remedy and found them insufficient. Some involved negligence rather than unseaworthiness; others involved longshoremen rather than Jones Act seamen. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, (1980) 446 U.S. 274 and American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, (1980) 446 U.S. 274 likewise did not establish the necessary historical tradition. Indeed, Alvez itself recognized that there had previously been no clear decisional authority establishing a general maritime right to loss-of-society damages.
Echoing Batterton, the court concluded that the absence of evidence showing that loss of consortium was traditionally available in personal-injury unseaworthiness actions was “practically dispositive.”
Uniformity With the Jones Act
The second Batterton consideration pointed in the same direction. Because loss of consortium is unavailable under the Jones Act, allowing the same damages through an overlapping unseaworthiness claim would conflict with the goal of maintaining a uniform remedial scheme.
The Simerley court relied directly upon Batterton’s reasoning that unseaworthiness operates as a “duplicate and substitute” for a Jones Act claim. Just as Batterton declined to permit punitive damages through unseaworthiness when those damages were unavailable under the Jones Act, Simerley declined to permit loss of consortium damages through unseaworthiness where the parallel statutory scheme did not provide that remedy.
Policy Considerations
Finally, the court found no independent policy ground supporting recognition of loss of consortium. Again, relying on Batterton, the court emphasized that the overriding objective is to pursue the policy reflected in congressional enactments, rather than judicially create remedies inconsistent with those Congress has supplied in analogous areas.
The Court of Appeal also noted that because there was no demonstrated historical tradition of consortium damages for personal-injury unseaworthiness claims, and because the parallel Jones Act scheme does not permit such recovery, loss of consortium was unavailable under general maritime law. The order sustaining the District’s demurrer was affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The ever-continuing quest for maritime law uniformity continues with Simerly. Simerley is a significant application of The Dutra Group v. Batterton beyond the particular punitive-damages question decided by the Supreme Court in 2019.
The remedy sought in Simerley was different, but the analytical question was the same: when a party asks a court to recognize a remedy under general maritime law, how should the court determine whether that remedy is available in light of maritime history and the remedies Congress has authorized?
The California Court of Appeal answered that question by applying Batterton. It examined the historical availability of the particular remedy for the particular maritime claim, compared the requested remedy with the parallel Jones Act statutory scheme, and considered whether policy nevertheless supported expanding the available relief.
The result confirms the broader significance of the framework established in EPS’s Supreme Court case. Batterton did more than resolve whether punitive damages are recoverable for unseaworthiness. It supplied an analytical framework for evaluating the availability of remedies under general maritime law—one that the California Court of Appeal has now expressly applied in a published decision to reject loss of consortium damages for the spouse of an injured Jones Act seaman.
(Barry W. Ponticello and Renee C. St.Clair just prior to the Batterton argument)
